Leading Businesses. Moving Michigan Forward.

Board Policies - Legislative Reform

Approved by the Michigan Chamber Board of Directors January 25, 2012

The Michigan Chamber of Commerce supports reform of the recall process for public officials in Michigan.

Special interests and political parties have recently begun to use recall as a political weapon against public officials not for misconduct in office, but because of policy disagreements with that public official.

Michigan courts from 1926 to 1960 restricted recall of public officials in Michigan to instances of malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance in office. However, the 1963 Michigan Constitution made recall a political rather than a legal question. The recall provision in the state Constitution is not self-executing. The Constitution provides that the legislature shall enact laws providing for the recall of public officials. Absent a constitution amendment, the legislature cannot restrict recall to misconduct in office.

The Michigan Chamber supports such an amendment to the Constitution, but recognizes that the amendment process is a difficult and costly task. To put such an amendment on the ballot for voter approval would require either a 2/3 vote in both houses of the state legislature or as an alternative, the circulation of petitions seeking signatures for such an amendment equal to 10% of the total vote cast for Governor in the last election (2010 – 322,609). Absent an effort to amend the constitution, the Michigan Chamber supports legislation to reform the recall process. The following reforms can be accomplished statutorily without amending the Constitution:

  • The Michigan Chamber advocates legislation to shorten the time period in which petitions can be circulated that call for the recall of a public official from 90 days to 60 days.
  • The Michigan Chamber advocates legislation that eliminates the requirement for a clarity hearing and the approval of the language by a county elections board before a recall petition can be circulated. Under Michigan’s Constitution recall is to be a political rather than a legal decision. The clarity of the reason for a recall should be the function of the recall election campaign.
  • The Michigan Chamber advocates legislation to streamline recall elections. Instead of having one election to determine whether the public official should be recalled, and if recalled another election to fill the vacancy, this process should be condensed into one election where the public official being recalled would have the opportunity to run against other candidates seeking that office.

Background

Michigan and Oregon were the first two states to provide for recall of public officials in their Constitutions in 1908. In 1903, Los Angeles, California became the first city to provide for recall in their City Charter. Sixteen states provide for recall of state officials and thirty-six provide for recall of local officials.

Since 1908, nationally only two governors have been recalled, Lynn Frazier in North Dakota in 1921 and Gray Davis in California in 2003. Since 1908 only thirteen state legislators have been recalled: California – 1913, 1914 and 1995 (2); Michigan – 1983 (2) and 2011; Oregon – 1988; Wisconsin – 1996, 2003 and 2011 (2); Arizona – 2011.

Recall is much more common at the local level than at the state level.

In 1926 in Newberg v. Donnelly, the Michigan Supreme Court required a showing of malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance before recall could be commenced. That standard lasted thirty-four years when in 1960 the Michigan Supreme Court reversed Newberg precedent and held that recall was a political not a judicial question (Wallace v. Tripp).

In 1961-62 delegates to the Constitutional Convention were well aware of the Wallace case reversing Newberg. The 1963 Constitution specifically provided: “…the reasons or grounds shall be political rather than a judicial question”. In 1979 in an Attorney General Opinion, Frank Kelley opined that pending legislation to limit recall to malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance would be unconstitutional in violation of the express terms of Article II, Section 8.

Recall is not a self-executing provision in the state Constitution. It requires the legislature to enact laws regarding recall. Michigan’s recall law consists of twenty-six sections of the Election Code. The problem with recall is a little like Michigan’s problem with term limits: not all term limits are created equal and not all recall laws are created equal. A strong argument can be made if Michigan adopted the wrong model for both.

There are three models for recall: Michigan, California and Wisconsin. The Michigan model:

Clarity Hearing on reasons for recall
90 Day Petition Drive
Signature requirements equal to 25% of the total vote cast for Governor in that jurisdiction (Constitutional requirement)
Determination of signature sufficiency
Special Recall Election
Special Election to fill vacancy if public official is recalled
Recalled official cannot run in this election

The process can last ten to eleven months or more which keeps a community in turmoil for far too long.

California Model:

120 day petition drive
Signature requirement equal to 12% of the total vote cast for Governor in that jurisdiction (Constitutional requirement)
Two part recall election:

First question:
Shall Gray Davis be recalled (removed) from the office of Governor? Yes or No

Second question:
Candidates listed to succeed Gray Davis as Governor if he is recalled
Vote for one:
In 2003 Arnold Schwarzenegger was one of 135 candidates

If recall against Davis had failed, it would have wasted a lot of effort. The California model provides a greater incentive to toss the incumbent out.

Wisconsin Model:

Recall Committee simply registers (no need to state reasons for recall of state officials) and has 60 days to complete the petition drive.
Signature requirement equal to 25% of the total vote cast for Governor in that jurisdiction (Constitutional requirement).
Special Recall Election – Incumbent is automatically place on the ballot. Other candidate can file to be on the ballot.
The highest vote getter finishes out the remainder of the term.

The advantages of the Wisconsin Model over Michigan’s recall process are:

  1. Limit petition drive to 60 days not 90 days.
  2. Allow incumbent’s name to automatically appear on the ballot – gives public official more of a fighting chance to keep his/her office by running against other candidates.
  3. Michigan’s Recall Election: Public Office is measured against some imaginary ideal and we don’t know who is likely to be the potential successor if the public official is recalled.
  4. Recall in Michigan has become a public humiliation. In Wisconsin it is more a political contest between competing candidates.

The Michigan Legislature can adopt the Wisconsin Model by statute without the need to amend the State Constitution.

There are some individuals and groups who think the current recall process for public officials in Michigan is adequate and should be retained as is. This view is reflected in the attached article from the Mackinac Center for Public Policy.

Approved by Board of Directors, April 20, 2005

The Michigan Chamber of Commerce supports reasonable term limits and legislative reforms on elected officials in the executive and legislative branches of state government.

The Michigan Chamber of Commerce believes the limits adopted by Michigan voters in 1992 for the executive officers of the state (two 4-year terms) to be acceptable, and acknowledges the efforts of many Chamber members in getting them adopted in Michigan. However, the Chamber recognizes that some members believe the limits on legislators (three 2-year terms in the House, and two 4-year terms in the Senate) are too short, and others believe they are the proper length.

The Chamber is willing to discuss alternatives to the current term limits and legislative reforms for legislators in Michigan, and to review focus group and polling data on the topics.

Adoption of this policy does not commit the Michigan Chamber to endorse a specific proposal to amend the term limit amendment. Any proposal drafted as a result of this research would be subject to the approval of the Board of Directors.

Background

Interested organizations and individuals who work with Michigan legislators generally agree that limiting State Representatives to six years is insufficient to develop adequate knowledge of appropriation and policy issues.

Two states had term limit extension proposals on their statewide ballots on November 2, 2004. Both proposals went down to crushing defeat.

Arkansas -- Yes 30%, No 70%

Montana -- Yes 31%, No 69%

Arkansas’ proposed Constitutional Amendment would have extended legislative service from six years in the State House and eight years in the State Senate to 12 years in the House and another 12 years in the Senate

Montana’s proposed Constitutional Amendment would have extended service in the State House and Senate from eight years in a 16-year period to 12 years in a 24-year period in each legislative chamber.

The Arkansas proposal was placed on the ballot by petition. The Montana proposal was placed on the ballot by the legislature.

To have reasonable opportunity for approval of a Constitutional amendment in Michigan, the focus of discussion may need to be expanded beyond term limits to include legislative reform. The following are elements of a possible Legislative Reform Amendment:

  1. No legislator could serve more than 12 years in either the House, Senate or both. This is similar to the Pappageorge Proposal (14 year limit) which tested the best in polling done in 2003. This proposal cuts two years from the maximum legislative service that is currently permitted (6 years House and 8 years Senate = 14 years), possibly eliminating or diminishing opposition to change from term limit advocates.
  2. Reduce the size of the State Senate from 38 to a lower odd number that would not result in a tie, and divide each Senate district into three House districts.
    33 x 3 = 99 State House Districts (-11)
    35 x 3 = 105 State House Districts (-5)
    or
    Maintain current size of Senate and House
  3. Impose Staff Size Limitation. Each Senator could employ no more than five full-time employees (FTE’s). Representatives could employ no more than 2.5 FTE’s. House Caucus staffs could employ no more than one person for every member in the party caucus. Senate Caucus staffs could employ no more than three people for every member of their party caucus. Employees of the non-partisan Legislative Council, such as Legislative Service Bureau, House and Senate Fiscal Agencies, etc. could also be staff limited.
  4. Adopt the Iowa Plan for Redistricting in 2011 and beyond. The Iowa Plan delegates the drawing of redistricting plans to the Legislative Service Bureau (LSB) which draws districts using traditional redistricting criteria (similar to Michigan’s Apol standards – acceptable population variance; preservation of county, city and township lines; adherence to Federal Voting Rights Act; contiguous districts, etc.) with no use of political voting behavior data base permitted. The legislature votes on the LSB plan without amendment.
  5. Leadership Limitation. No legislator could serve more than four years as House Speaker or Senate Majority Leader. This would encourage leadership ladders: Committee Chair, Floor Leader, and Speaker. Individuals would likely work their way up the ladder, providing the opportunity for significant experience prior to becoming a leader. Minority leadership positions would be unaffected. Like in the U.S. House and U.S. Senate, no legislator could serve more than six years as a chair of a standing committee.
  6. Prohibit Lame Duck Sessions. 
    Require the legislature to adjourn sine die on or before October 1 in an even numbered year. The ability of the Governor to call a special session of the legislature would be unaffected.
  7. Remove legislator pay from the purview of the State Officers Compensation Commission. Freeze legislative pay at levels currently in effect. Future increases are contingent on certain conditions including:
    a. The entire state budget must be enacted on or before June 30th for the fiscal year beginning October 1st.
    b. The Budget Stabilization Fund has a balance of $100,000,000 or more.
    c. Private sector employment in the State of Michigan is maintained or increased from the previous year.
    If these conditions are met, legislative pay will be increased automatically by 3% or the rate of inflation, whichever is less.
  8. Any bill that establishes a new tax, new user fee, or increases an existing tax or existing user fee shall lay over in each house a minimum of 10 days before being eligible for passage; and shall be subject to at least one public hearing and one committee meeting held by the standing committee with proper jurisdiction in each house.

Approved by Board of Directors, September 14, 2005

The Michigan Chamber of Commerce supports reasonable term limits and reforms to the legislative branch of state government. A proposed constitutional amendment that would be submitted to voters at a general election to accomplish this goal should include the following provisions:

  • Require annual personal financial disclosure by legislators.
  • Require all taxation bills before becoming law to be in the possession of each legislative chamber 10 days, and receive a public hearing and committee vote in each chamber.
  • Limit combined service in the legislature to a total of 14 years in the House, Senate or both.
  • Prohibit former legislators from becoming legislative agents for two years after leaving office.
  • Reduce the salary of legislators on a pro-rata basis for each day they are absent from session without a compelling reason approved by the membership of that legislative chamber on a recorded vote.

The Michigan Chamber’s board of directors authorizes Chamber staff to work with a coalition of interested persons and organizations to conduct a petition drive to qualify this proposal for the ballot.

Background

The 1992 term limits amendment to the Michigan Constitution attempted to bring new individuals and ideas into state government. Michigan went from no limits on service for legislators, Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of State to a lifetime limit of six years for State Representatives, eight years for State Senators, and eight years for Governor, Attorney General and Secretary of State.

This policy proposal supports 14 years as a reasonable time limit for service in the legislature; however, the lifetime limit would be 14 years in either chamber, or a combined 14 years in both chambers.

Most states do not have legislative term limits. In the 15 states that adopted term limits in the 1990s and are still in place today, there is variance. Most have 8-year limits for both legislative chambers, and the limitations are on consecutive terms not lifetime bans. Michigan and two other states fall outside the national term limit norm and are the most restrictive with regard to term limits.

Public opinion polling indicates that voters continue to support the concept of term limits; however, they are not necessarily opposed to attempts to fine tune them.

In the past, many members of the legislature were what advocates of term limits considered “career politicians.” Now they are not. They often have other careers to which they may return. Yet, Michigan is one of only three states in the nation without a personal financial disclosure requirement for legislators or state officials. Also, there is the possibility that those serving in the legislature could be unduly influenced on important issues by the prospect of employment opportunities immediately upon leaving legislative service.

Some legislators miss dozens or hundreds of votes, without any impact on their compensation. Most job holders have pay reduced if they miss work on a regular basis, and the possibility of immediate dismissal.

One recurring complaint in Michigan is that, despite the fact that the legislature is full-time, too much business is done at the last minute. There is little time for the public to weigh in, and when it comes to creating or repealing taxes, or raising or lowering existing taxes, action can be taken in a very short timeframe without much opportunity for public input.

The proposal before the board of directors was drafted based upon survey research and focus groups commissioned after the April 20, 2005 Board meeting. A coalition of corporations, associations and labor organizations assisted the Chamber in funding that research. This proposal has a good opportunity to be passed by state voters if it reaches the ballot.

In summary, this proposal retains term limits. It keeps the influx of new individuals and ideas in the legislature. It provides the opportunity for committee members and chairs, and legislative leaders, to have more experience in dealing with Michigan’s public policy issues.

This proposal adds more accountability by docking the pay of legislators who miss session and roll call votes without an excused absence. It requires legislation on taxes to be given a fair hearing and a chance for the public to be heard.

The proposal adds stricter ethics standards by requiring personal financial disclosure for state elected officials and prohibits former legislators from becoming lobbyist agents for two years after leaving office.

table


 

Proposal 06 – __

A Proposal to Amend Provisions of the State Constitution

Relating to the Legislative Branch

The proposed constitutional amendment would:

  1. Require annual personal financial disclosure by legislators.
  2. Require all taxation bills before becoming law to be in possession of each house 10 days, receive in each house a public hearing and committee vote.
  3. Limit combined service in the legislature to a total of 14 years in the house, senate or both.
  4. Prohibit former legislators from becoming lobbyist agents for two years after leaving office.
  5. Reduce salary of legislators for each day they are absent from session without a compelling reason approved on a recorded vote.

Should this proposal be adopted?

Yes _______

No _______

 


 

Term Limits Plus: Common Sense Legislative Reforms for Michigan

Article IV

Require Financial Disclosure

Sec. 10. No member of the legislature nor any state officer shall be interested directly or indirectly in any contract with the state or any political subdivision thereof which shall cause a substantial conflict of interest. TO AVOID CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, EACH MEMBER OF THE LEGISLATURE OR STATE OFFICER SHALL ANNUALLY PUBLICALLY DISCLOSE HIS OR HER EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS, SOURCES OF INCOME, CREDITORS, DEBTORS, AND PROPERTY OWNER SHIP. The legislature shall further implement this provision by appropriate legislation.

Prevent Stealth Tax Changes

Sec. 32. NOT WITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, every law which imposes, continues or revises a tax shall distinctly state the tax. NO BILL WHICH IMPOSES, REPEALS, CONTINUES, DECREASES OR INCREASES A TAX SHALL BE PASSED AND BECOME LAW AT ANY REGULAR OR SPECIAL SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, UNLESS IT HAS BEEN PRINTED OR REPRODUCED AND IN THE POSSESSION OF EACH LEGISLATIVE CHAMBER FOR AT LEAST TEN DAYS, IS SUBJECT TO AT LEAST ONE PUBLIC HEARING IN EACH CHAMBER, AND IS VOTED ON IN COMMITTEE IN EACH CHAMBER.

Overall, Strengthen Not Lengthen Term Limits

Sec. 54. No person shall be elected to the office of state representative more that three times. No person shall be elected to the office of state senate more than two times OR STATE SENATOR FOR A COMBINED TOTAL OF MORE THAN 14 YEARS. Any person appointed or elected to fill a vacancy in the House of Representatives or the State Senate for a period greater than one half of a term of each office, WHO HOLDS OFFICE FOR ONE DAY OR MORE WITHIN A CALENDAR YEAR, shall be considered to have been elected to serve one time in that office SERVED THE ENTIRE CALENDAR YEAR for purposes of this section. This limitation on the number of times YEARS a person shall be elected to MAY SERVE IN office shall apply to terms of office beginning on or after January 1, 1993. A PERSON IS NOT ELIGIBLE TO BE APPOINTED OR ELECTED TO THE OFFICE OF STATE REPRESENTATIVE OR STATE SENATOR UNLESS THAT PERSON IS ELIGIBLE TO COMPLETE THE ENTIRE TERM OF THAT OFFICE UNDER THIS SECTION.

This section shall be self-executing. Legislation may be enacted to facilitate operation of this section, but no law shall limit or restrict the application of this section. If any part of this section is held to be invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining parts of this section shall not be affected but will remain in full force and effect.

No Work, No Pay

Sec. 55. IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF EACH LEGISLATOR TO ATTEND SESSION EACH DAY THE LEGISLATIVE BODY IS IN SESSION. ANY DAY THE LEGISLATIVE BODY IS IN SESSION AND A LEGISLATOR DOES NOT ATTEND SESSION, THAT LEGISLATOR SHALL HAVE HIS OR HER SALARY REDUCED ON A PRO RATA BASIS UNLESS THE LEGISLATOR RECEIVES AN EXCUSED ABSENCE. THE REASON FOR THE EXCUSED ABSENCE SHALL BE PUBLICLY STATED AND APPROVED ON A RECORD ROLL CALL VOTE OF THAT LEGISLATIVE BODY. AN EXCUSED ABSENCE SHALL ONLY BE GRANTED FOR A COMPELLING REASON SUCH AS THE BIRTH OR ADOPTION OF A CHILD OR GRANDCHILD, MILITARY DUTY, SERIOUS ILLNESS OF THE LEGISLATOR OR A MEMBER OF THE LEGISLATOR’S FAMILY, OR DEATH OF A FAMILY MEMBER. AN EXCUSED ABSENCE SHALL NOT BE GRANTED FOR AN OUT OF STATE TRIP OR TOUR TAKEN AT PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EXPENSE, VACATION, OR TIME SPENT CAMPAIGNING FOR OFFICE.

Close the Revolving Door

Sec. 56. A FORMER MEMBER OF THE SENATE OR HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL NOT BE A LOBBYIST AGENT FOR 2 YEARS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE END OF THE TERM OF OFFICE TO WHICH HE OR SHE WAS ELECTED.

Approved by Board of Directors, April 26, 2007

 

The Michigan Chamber of Commerce recommends a “No” vote on the question of whether the state should convene a new constitutional convention (Con-Con) that will appear on the November 2, 2010 election ballot.

The Michigan Chamber strongly supported the adoption of a new constitution for the state in 1963. We believe that the constitution of 1963 has served Michigan citizens well.

The costs to Michigan society, both in the actual costs of the convention (estimated at $28 – $31 million) and the special election of Con-Con delegates, are not merited. A process is provided for amending the present constitution. The Michigan Chamber believes that amendments, where deemed appropriate by the electors, can best be achieved on an issue-by-issue basis rather than through a complete revision.

Furthermore, the Michigan Chamber will act as the catalyst to form a coalition of organizations opposed to a call for a new constitutional convention in 2010 as it did in 1978 and 1994.

Background

On November 2, 2010, as Michigan voters go to the polls to elect a new Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General, as well as the entire State Legislature, the electorate will also be asked to decide whether to call a new constitutional convention for the State of Michigan.

The ballot proposal will be on the statewide ballot not by the action of the current Legislature or as a result of any petition drive; rather the state’s constitution requires that this question be placed before state voters every 16 years.

Since this proposal automatically goes on the ballot, the constitutional convention question (Con-Con) will be Proposal 10-1 on the November 2, 2010 ballot.

If voters defeat this proposal in 2010, the question will automatically reappear in 2026 and, if defeated, again in 2042 and every 16 years thereafter – 2058, 2079 and 2090.

The people of Michigan have adopted over the years four state constitutions in 1835, 1850, 1908 and most recently in 1963. In contrast, the United States has had only one constitution over the past 220 years.

Michigan’s first constitutional convention was held while Michigan was still a territory. Congress, before granting statehood after accepting that constitution, required Michigan to recognize the loss of Toledo to Ohio in return for the western portion of the Upper Peninsula.

Michigan’s first constitution provided for a strong governor whose power of appointment even included the Attorney General, Secretary of State and Supreme Court Justices.

The undoing of the 1835 constitution were provisions granting the Legislature the authority to spend and borrow state money for internal improvements such as roads and canals. The Legislature proceeded to spend the state into fiscal crisis.

Pressure mounted to replace the 1835 constitution with a new document restricting the spending and borrowing power of the Legislature and extending “Jacksonian Democracy” by electing most of Michigan state-level public officials rather than having them appointed by the governor. The Legislature placed the question of a new constitutional convention on the ballot in 1849, which was approved. In 1850, Michigan held a second constitutional convention which wrote a document twice as long as the 1835 constitution full of legislative detail and created an infamous “long ballot” to elect seven statewide officials. Also included in the 1850 constitution was a requirement that in 1866 and every 16 years thereafter the question on whether to call a new constitutional convention be placed on the ballot. That constitutional requirement has continued ever since.

In 1866 when the question first appeared, Michigan voters agreed to call a new constitutional convention. However, in 1867, the new constitution that the convention had spent months drafting was rejected by the voters. In 1874, similar attempts to revise the constitution were rejected by the voters.

There were four more elections on whether to call a new constitutional convention in 1882, 1892, 1898 and 1904. The last three of those elections the Con-Con question received a majority of those voting on the question but not a majority of those voting in the election as was required.

Finally, in 1906, Michigan voters agreed to hold a new constitutional convention, which was held in Lansing in 1907-1908.

Every constitutional convention reflects the issues of the times. The 1908 constitution provided for such progressive reforms as municipal home rule, line item veto, initiative and referendum and women and child labor restrictions, but it retained the “long ballot” and most features of the 1850 constitution including the requirement that every 16 years the question to call a constitutional convention be placed on the ballot.

In 1926, 1942, 1948 and 1958, the Con-Con question was on the statewide ballot. In 1948 and 1958, voters cast more yes votes than no votes, but did not obtain a majority of those voting in the election. In 1960, the League of Women Voters, the Michigan Jaycees and a group headed by auto executive George Romney, called Citizens for Michigan, launched a petition drive to amend the requirements for calling a new constitutional convention. Their “Gateway Amendment” would no longer require a majority voting in the election, but merely a majority voting on the question.

Their proposal provided that delegates to a constitutional convention be elected from each State House and Senate district rather than three from each Senate district whose district lines had not been redistricted since 1925. The proposal also provided that the question to call a new constitutional convention be placed on the April 1961 ballot and every 16 years thereafter.

In November 1960, while Michigan voters were electing John F. Kennedy president, the “Gateway Amendment” was approved.

Five months later, Michigan voters narrowly approved the call for a new constitutional convention. The question lost in 79 counties but the vote margin in Wayne, Oakland, Macomb and Washtenaw counties, where it carried, were enough to give the question a 23,000 vote margin.

In the summer of 1961, delegates were nominated and elected in partisan elections and the convention convened in Lansing in October 1961.

The 1961-62 Constitutional Convention produced a new generation of leadership. George Romney was elected a delegate and went on in 1962 to be elected governor. Other Con-Con delegates who left their mark on Michigan politics were Secretary of State Richard Austin, Detroit Mayor Coleman Young and Congressmen Bill Ford, Ed Hutchinson and Garry Brown. The convention also produced five State Senators, 14 State Representatives and two Appellate Judges.

Ironically, the 1963 Michigan constitution almost suffered the same fate as the 1867 and 1873 constitutional drafts. The constitution was adopted by less than 7,500 votes and had to survive a statewide recount.

Since 1963, our current Michigan constitution has been amended 30 times; 37 proposed amendments have been rejected. Only nine of the 30 amendments were a result of petition drives. Twenty-one of the 37 proposed amendments rejected by the voters were placed on the ballot by petition.

In 1978, the automatic question to call a new constitutional convention went before state voters for the first time since the adoption of the 1963 constitution. Michigan voters defeated the call by a 70% to 30% margin and again in 1994 by a 72% to 28% margin. The Michigan Chamber managed the opposition to a call for a constitutional convention in both campaigns.

If voters approve the call for a new constitutional convention in 2010, delegates would be elected within six months. The elections would be partisan, requiring a primary election and a general election to be held no later than May 3, 2011. One-hundred-forty-eight delegates would be elected, one each from every State House and Senate district. These 148 delegates would convene in Lansing not later than October 4, 2011. The convention could be expected to last at least until July 2012. Constitutional conventions in Michigan are unlimited in scope – they can propose a completely new constitution or offer specific amendments. Any proposed constitution or amendment approved by a majority of the delegates must be submitted to the voters not less than 90 days following the adjournment of the convention.

If voters approve Proposal 10-1 on the November 2, 2010 statewide ballot, issues may include:

  • State legislative and congressional district reapportionment – how to do it.
  • Direct gubernatorial appointment of all department directors eliminating commission or board appointment of directors of DNR, Agriculture, Education, Civil Rights and Civil Service.
  • An elected or an appointed judiciary.
  • Election or appointment of the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, and Wayne State University Governing Boards.
  • Abortion rights.
  • Term limits/Unicameral Legislature.
  • Repeal of the State Officers Compensation Commission.
  • Removal of the prohibition on the death penalty.
  • Revisit the cap on the sales tax and the prohibition of a graduated income tax.
  • Headlee tax limits and prohibition on new state mandates without state funding.
  • Eliminate the elected posts of Secretary of State and Attorney General and provide for direct gubernatorial appointment.
  • Public school district consolidation.
  • Elimination of township government.
  • Restore affirmative action programs by state government and public universities.
  • Remove ban on same sex marriage.
  • Permit a physician-assisted suicide.
  • Provide for drug legalization.
  • Remove the prohibition on public aid to non public education.
  • School funding and equity.

On December 12, 2006, the organization, Citizens for Michigan, completed a four-year review of the 1963 constitution. Citizens for Michigan, in addition to making 62 specific recommendations to change the constitution, urged approval of the call for a constitutional convention in 2010. The alternative is to be supportive of constitutional reform and modernization without agreeing to a constitutional free-for-all at a convention. Constitutional change can come about amendment by amendment. Although the present constitution is not perfect, it contains no fatal flaw.

 

Approved by Board of Directors, September 18, 2007

 

The Michigan Chamber of Commerce has previously expressed its opposition to calling a new Constitutional Convention for Michigan in 2010, when that question is next placed automatically before state voters. However, the Michigan Chamber supports periodic revision of the Michigan Constitution on an amendment-by-amendment basis. The Michigan Chamber of Commerce recognizes that the current Michigan Constitution adopted in 1963 contains certain deficiencies that should be addressed by policy-makers and voters. Several provisions in the Michigan Constitution are inoperative and obsolete because they violate the U.S. Constitution.

One of the primary reasons for having a written Constitution is to inform citizens of the fundamental law by which they are governed. Therefore, the text of the Michigan Constitution should reflect the actual status of state law.

The Michigan Chamber supports placing an amendment on the ballot in 2008 to delete the invalid provisions that are in conflict with United States Supreme Court and Michigan Supreme Court interpretations of the United States Constitution. Passage of such an amendment would remove one of the arguments proponents cite as a reason to call a new constitutional convention.

Background

The following provisions have been invalid for many years. Their deletion from the Michigan Constitution need not be accompanied by replacement provisions:

Exclusionary Rule

In People v Pennington, 383 Mich 611 (1970), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the last sentence of Section 11 of Article 1, which allowed certain evidence to be admitted into criminal proceedings, violated the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961). In general terms, the exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained by law enforcement in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution must be excluded from criminal proceedings.

Voting Age

The requirement contained in Section 1 of Article 2 that voters be at least 21 years of age was rendered invalid by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which reduced the voting age to 18.

Property Ownership Requirement

Section 6 of Article 2 restricted to property owners the right to vote on certain ad valorem tax limitation increases and bond issues. This provision has not been enforceable since the United State Supreme Court held that such restrictions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. City of Phoenix v Kolodziejski, 399 US 204 (1970). The reference to this property ownership requirement found in Section 6 of Article 9 of the State Constitution is also inoperative for the same reason.

County Board of Supervisors

Section 7 of Article 7 required that a board of supervisors be established in each county of the state. The board of supervisors was to consist of one member from each organized township and representation from cities as provided by law. In 1966, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the method of apportioning county boards of supervisors violated the equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Advisory Opinion re: Constitutionality of Public Act 261 of 1966, 380 Mich 736 (1966). The Michigan Supreme Court followed the reasoning of a U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding the redistricting of local governmental legislative bodies. The Michigan legislature later enacted county commission redistricting standards legislation (MCL 46.401).

Prohibition of Public Aid to Nonpublic Schools

In 1970, Section 2 of Article 8 was amended to prohibit public financial support for non-public schools. The amendment added three sentences to Section 2. In Traverse City School District v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390 (1971), The Michigan Supreme Court held that a portion of the second sentence violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (free exercise of religion and equal protection of the laws, respectively). The sentence in question, and that portion of it held invalid, provided that “[n]o payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or deduction, tuition voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or property shall be provided directly or indirectly, to support the attendance of any student or the employment of any person at any such nonpublic school or at any location or institution where instruction is offered in whole or in part to such nonpublic school student.”

Legislative Apportionment

Parts of five sections in Article 4 that relate to legislative apportionment are invalid. Legislative apportionment is the method by which the state is divided into geographic districts from which voters elect state Senators and state Representatives. The state Constitution is deficient as regards to legislative apportionment in two respects: it neither specifies what official is responsible for legislative apportionment, nor what standards are to govern the process. Less than one year after the state Constitution was adopted, a majority of the apportionment provisions (Sections 2 through 6 of Article 4) were rendered unconstitutional by virtue of the United States Supreme Court decision of Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964). The essence of Reynolds is that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that both houses of a state legislature be apportioned on the basis of one person, one vote. The Michigan Supreme Court invalidated the Commission on Legislative Apportionment in 1982. The Michigan Supreme adopted redistricting standards for the drawing of house and senate districts and appointed Bernard Apol, retired director of the Bureau of Elections as a special master to draw a plan following those standards for the 1982 election. In 1996, the Michigan legislature enacted a State Legislative Redistricting Standards Act, which codified the standards used by the Michigan Supreme Court in adopting a state legislative redistricting plan in 1982 and 1992 (MCL 4.261).

Term Limits on Federal Officials Elected from Michigan

Article II, Section 10 of the Michigan Constitution was added by the adoption of Proposal B in November 1992. Members of the U.S. House of Representatives from Michigan were restricted to serving no more than three two-year terms (6 years) in a twelve year time period. U.S. Senators elected from Michigan were restricted to serving no more than two six-year terms (12 years) in a 24 year time period. State term limits on federal legislators were challenged in Arkansas. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1995 held that states could not impose term limits on federal officials, only an amendment to the U.S. Constitution could impose such limitations. U.S. Term Limits v Thorton 514 U.S. 779 (1995).